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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE COURT
WHOSE JUDGMENT IS SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED
The following is a complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the Court whose
judgment is sought to be reviewed. Not all are parties to this appeal.

[

1. Brasher's Auto Auction, d/b/a Brasher's Salt Lake Auto Auction - Plaintiff. Plaintiffs
complaint against Defendants was dismissed with prejudice June 11th, 2001 pursuant to a
settlement agreement. Brasher's is not a party to the appeal.

?

2. Shar's Cars, a limited liability company - Defendant, Third Party Plaintiff, and
Appellant. Shar's Cars, LLC, is a party to the appeal. Shar's Cars, LLC is hereafter referred to
as "Shar's Cars".
3. Jeffrey D. Birschbach - Defendant, Third Party Plaintiff, and Appellant. Birschbach is
a party to the appeal. Jeffrey D. Birschbach is hereafter referred to as "Creditor Birschbach".
4. Western Surety Company - Defendant. The Plaintiffs complaint against Defendant
was dismissed with prejudice June 11th, 2001 pursuant to a settlement agreement. This
Defendant is not a party to the appeal.
5. Sharla Birschbach - Third Party Plaintiff.

Third Party Plaintiffs complaint against

the Third Party Defendants was dismissed with prejudice at trial December 5th, 2002. This Third
Party Plaintiff is not a party to the appeal.
6. Deloy Elder - Third Party Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant. Deloy Elder is a
party to the appeal and is hereafter referred to as "Elder".
7. Bruce Rutherford - Third Party Defendant. The Court entered a default judgment
against this Third Party Defendant on motion of Third Party Plaintiffs December 31 st , 2002.

-ii-

Rutherford is not a party to the appeal. Bruce Rutherford is hereafter referred to as "Rutherford".

-iii-
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SHAR'S CARS, LLC, a Utah limited liability company
and JEFFREY D. BIRSCHBACH,
CaseNo.20030082-CA
Appellants and Cross-Appellee,
vs.
DELOY ELDER,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §§
78-2-2(3)0), 78-2-2(4), and 78-2a-3(2)(j), (1953), as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
REGARDING THE CROSS-APPEAL
The following issues are presented for review pursuant to the Appellee's cross-appeal.
1. Whether the trial court erred in making its determination that Elder breached the
contract. This is a mixed question of fact and law. Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573 (Utah
App. 1993).
Standard of Review: Factual findings of the trial court are upheld unless they are
clearly erroneous. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports. 2003 UT App 201. Legal conclusions are
reviewed for correctness, giving the trial court's conclusion no particular deference. Id.
This issue was a contested issue throughout the trial and preserved for appeal. Tr.
1

at 1359, pp. 225-230; 326 - 328; 357-358.
2. Whether the trial court erred in deciding that the subsequent agreement between Shar's
Cars and Rutherford did not constitute a full release of liability pursuant to partnership law,
novation, executory accord, accord and satisfaction, release, waiver or estoppel. This is a mixed
question of fact and law. Mostrong v. Jackson, supra.
Standard of Review: Factual findings of the trial court are upheld unless they are
clearly erroneous. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, supra. Legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness, giving the trial court's conclusion no particular deference. Id.
This issue was a contested issue throughout the trial and preserved for appeal.
Tr. at 1359, pp. 225 - 229; 328 - 329; 332 - 334; 338 - 344; 358..
3. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that general and/or consequential damages
were capable of determination with reasonable certainty or within the contemplation of the
contracting parties. This is a mixed question of fact and law. Mostrong v. Jackson, supra.
Standard of Review: Factual findings of the trial court are upheld unless they are
clearly erroneous. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, supra. Legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness, giving the trial court's conclusion no particular deference. Id.
This issue was a contested issue throughout the trial and preserved for appeal. Tr.
i

at 1359, pp. 244; 345-346; 348; 360-361.
4. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the amount of damages is $45,000.
Standard of Review: This is a factual finding for which the clearly erroneous
standard of appellate review applies. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah
1989). > . ,, -.

•
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This issue was a contested issue throughout the trial and preserved for appeal. Tr.
at 1359, pp. 244; 345-346; 348; 3260-361.
5. Whether the trial court erred in denying Elder's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of
Shar's Cars and Creditor Birschbach's case in chief.
Standard of Review: This is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness,
giving the trial court's conclusion no particular deference. Cook v. Zions First National Bank,
2002 UT 105, 57 P.3d 1084.
This issue was preserved for appeal pursuant to Elder' s motion to dismiss
brought at the conclusion of Creditor Birschbach's case in chief. Tr. at 1359 pp 225 - 244
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for breach of contract. The case was initiated by Brasher's Auto
Auction, dba Brasher's Salt Lake Auto Auction, a corporation, July 8th, 1999, against Shar's
Cars, LLC, Jeffrey D. Birschbach, Sharla Birschbach and Western Surety Company. Defendants
Shar's Cars, LLC, Jeffrey D. Birschbach and Sharla Birschbach answered and filed a Third Party
Complaint against Third Party Defendants Deloy Elder and Bruce Rutherford August 17th, 1999.
Third Party Defendant Deloy Elder answered. Third Party Defendant Bruce Rutherford never
did. A default judgment was entered against Rutherford December 31st, 2002.
Plaintiff Brasher's Auto Auction settled its claims against Defendants, Shar's Cars,
Birschbachs and Western Surety Complaint. Plaintiffs complaint against the defendants was
dismissed with prejudice June 11th, 2001.
The Third Party Plaintiffs case against Third Party Defendant Deloy Elder came on for
trial December 4th, and 5th, 2002. At the conclusion of Third Party Plaintiffs' case in chief, the
claims of Third Party Plaintiff Sharla Birschbach were dismissed with prejudice. Elder's motion
to dismiss all other counts and claims of the Third Party Plaintiffs' case was denied. At the
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conclusion of the trial, judgment was entered against Third Party Defendant Deloy Elder in favor
of Third Party Plaintiffs Shar's Cars, LLC and Jeffrey D. Birschbach. The judgment was
docketed on December 31st, 2002in the amount of $22,500.00.
Third Party Plaintiffs, Shar's Cars, LLC and Jeffrey D. Birschbach, filed their notice of
appeal January 21 st , 2003. Third Party Defendant Deloy Elder filed his notice of cross-appeal
January 29th, 2003.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. Creditor Birschbach and Shar's Cars
Creditor Birschbach is the sole owner of a successful company, American Union
Mortgage. It sells and brokers mortgages to the public. Tr. at 1358 at pp. 49-55. His wife,
Sharla, a stay at home mom, discussed the idea of operating a home business. The idea was that
it would be fun to go to an auto auction, buy a car, and offer it for sale while driving it,
essentially one at a time. Tr. at 1358, pp. 32 - 34; 56-57
They decided to call this home business "Shar's Cars", after Creditor Birschbach's wife's
name, Sharla. Creditor Birschbach then organized the business as a limited liability company,
naming himself as the only member and manager. Tr. at 1358, pp. 57; 60; 61-62. He also
opened a company checking account in the name of Shar's Cars at Zions Bank in October, 1997.
Tr. at 1358, pp. 58 - 59. Ultimately, Creditor Birschbach obtained a bond and was issued a Utah
motor vehicle dealer's license about January, 1998. Tr. at 1358 pp. 29 - 30; 57.
II. Elder's and Rutherford's Business.
Elder and Rutherford were in business together wholesaling cars. It was a partnership
they recently started. They were operating as licensed salesmen under a person who had a
dealer's license in Cache County, Utah. Tr at 1358, pp. 67-69. They were hoping to find a
person in Salt Lake County with a dealer's license so they could operate the business under that
4

T
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license instead, for convenience. Tr. at 1358. pp. 69-70
III. The Verbal Contract

^

Creditor Birschbach and Elder were acquaintances back when they were growing up in
Cache County, Utah. They were not really friends. Tr. at 1358, pp. 55-56. They had a chance
encounter at an auto auction in late January or early February, 1998, which led to a meeting
between Elder and Rutherford, and Creditor Birschbach. Tr. at 1358, pp. 12-14; 29-30; 65 - 66.
The middle to the third week of February of 1998, they met at a restaurant and there
entered into a verbal contract. Tr. at 1358, pp. 6 - 7; 31. The terms of the agreement were: 1)
Elder and Rutherford would continue to carry on their own business (selling vehicles retail and
wholesale), becoming licensed salesmen under Creditor Birschbach's dealer's license; Tr. at
1358, pp. 7-8; 31; 2) Elder and Rutherford's business would be conducted and kept separate
from that of Creditor Birschbach, his wife, and the limited liability company, with Elder and
Rutherford paying their own expenses and distributing profits between them pursuant to their
own partnership agreement; Tr. at 1358, p. 7; 3) In consideration, Elder and Rutherford agreed to
pay Creditor Birschbach $100 from the sale of every vehicle sold retail, (not wholesale), pay the
operating expenses for Shar's Cars, the LLC, and help Creditor Birschbach learn how to purchase
cars at auctions; Tr. at 1358, pp. 7-8; 31-32; 34-35. Also contemplated within the terms of the
agreement was Elder and Rutherford finding and opening a retail car lot and agreeing to pay all
the expenses for that. Tr. at 1358, pp. 31- 32; 34.

\\(

It was also agreed that Elder and Rutherford's partnership business would operate under
the name of Shar's Cars. But that would be separate from Creditor Birschbach's and his wife's
home Shar's Cars LLC business. The limited liability company's business would be transacted
through its own Shar's Cars Zions Bank acct. Elder and Rutherford's business would be
operated independent of creditor Birschbach's limited liability company. Tr. at 1358. pp. 32-33
From Creditor Birschbach's standpoint, it was great way to have all of his expenses
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covered for his and his wife's home business. Tr. at 1358, p 3. Additionally, Creditor
Birschbach was motivated by the idea that if Elder and Rutherford sold 15-20 cars a month, that
was $1500 to $2000 per month to him with no expense. Tr. at 1358, p. 36
IV. The Course of Conduct after Entering into the Contract.
After entering into the foregoing contract, Creditor Birschbach and his wife conducted
their home Shar's Cars business separate from the business of Elder and Rutherford. Tr. at 1358,
pp. 59 - 62; 70-71. While they operated their respective businesses separate from each other,
they operated under the same name - "Shar's Cars" - with Creditor Birschbach operating as an
LLC, granting a right to Elder and Rutherford to operate their business under the same name as a
d/b/a, (the retail car lot subsequently opened by Elder and Rutherford had to have the dealer's
name and license number at the physical location.) Tr. at 1358, pp. 62-65. Neither Creditor
Birschbach nor Elder or Rutherford had any right to manage the others' business or participate in
division of profits or be liable for expenses as to their separate businesses outside of the
aforementioned contractual obligations. Tr. at 1358. pp. 63-65.
For example, Creditor Birschbach's Shar's Cars LLC account was at Zions Bank and the
transactions handled through that account related solely to his and his wife's home business, plus
receipt of the contractual proceeds related to the Elder and Rutherford contract. On the other
hand, Elder and Rutherford conducted their own business through their own Shar's Cars dba
account with a separate bank, Washington Mutual, managing their own business. This was
principally how business under the verbal contract was conducted up to about August 15th, 1998.
Tr. at 1358, pp. 12; 14-17; 22; 25-26; 37-38; 73-84.

4

One change occurred in June, 1998. Creditor Birschbach extended a loan to Elder and
Rutherford for $25,000 to be paid back within 30 to 60 days. Tr. at 1358, pp. 15 - 16; 37 - 40.
The money came from a loan that Creditor Birschbach took out on a five to six year term with
payments of about $500 to $600 per month. The loan was not paid back by the time that Elder
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left about August 15th, 1998, although one or two of the monthly payments had been made by
that time by Elder. Tr. at 1358, pp 37-40; 84-85; 91-92.
V. The Dissolution
On or about August 15th, 1998, Elder left the business. He ceased and refused to carry on
any further business with Rutherford. He wanted to wrap the business up, sell the cars, pay the
debts, cut the losses and close the books. Tr. at 1358, pp. 8-9; 258 & Tr. at 1359, p. 248.
Creditor Birschbach knew about the dissolution between Elder and Rutherford and
acknowledges that Elder had nothing to with the business after the middle to the third week of
August, 1998. In fact, Elder warned Creditor Birschbach to watch out for Rutherford and that
because of Rutherford the business was not doing well - it was in the negative. . Tr. at 1358, pp.
10-11; 19-20; 27; 46; 92-93; 98.
VI. The New Agreement
Rutherford notified Creditor Birschbach of Elder's dissolution of the partnership. Tr. at
1358, pp. 45; 92 - 93. After telling Creditor Birschbach that Elder was out, Rutherford and
Creditor Birschbach met at a football field. There, Creditor Birschbach asked Rutherford how
the business was going and Rutherford said the business was down about $5,000 to $10,000,
whereupon a new agreement was entered into. Essentially, Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford
agreed to carry on without Elder. Creditor Birschbach agreed that Rutherford would carry on the
business without Elder, assume Creditor Birschbach's contract, and assume and pay the expenses
that the partnership had not previously paid up to that point time including the represented loss or
deficit. In other words, Creditor Birschbach would not look to Elder any more for payment.
Rutherford told Elder what the agreement was and that Elder could move on and not be further
responsible. Tr. at 1358, pp 45; 92 - 99 & Tr. at 1359, pp. 248 - 250
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VII. The Course of Conduct after Dissolution.
After dissolution and after entering into the new agreement, Creditor Birschbach and
Rutherford conducted themselves consistent with this new agreement - that is to continue the
business and release Elder from liability. In fact, as of the middle to the third week of August,
1998, Rutherford took over sole control of the business, subject to the requirements of Creditor
Birschbach, and assumed the agreement with Creditor Birschbach with the understanding that
Elder would no longer be involved and that Rutherford would assume the partnership debt. Tr. at
1358, pp. 86-98
Rutherford followed Creditor Birschbach's instruction or advice to make an employed
salesman manager - Mr. Neider. There was inventory on the Murray retail lot, either paid for, or
bought on the 30 day float, simply turned over to Rutherford and Creditor Birschbach.
Rutherford, and Creditor Birschbach made a deal to open a new bank account for continuation of
the business, with Creditor Birschbach and the employee manager, Mr. Neider, being the only
authorized signers on the account. Elder and Rutherford 's business bank account was closed
and the account balance, $29,267.27, was transferred to Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford in
accordance with the agreement to carry on without Elder. All of the books and records were
turned over to Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford. Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford agreed
that the payment of the 30 - 60 day $25,000 loan Creditor Birschbach previously provided to
Elder and Rutherford could be extended to allow Rutherford to make monthly payments of $500
to $600 per month. Tr. at 1358, pp. 15 - 16; 37 - 39; 49; 84 - 91; 96 - 98, & Tr. at 1359 pp. 251252.
Thereafter, Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford expanded the business to open a second
car lot in Midvale, Utah, incurring unaccounted for expenses and buying automobiles in
unknown amounts for that. This was done by Rutherford with the agreement of Creditor
Birschbach around the first part of October, 1998. Tr. at 1358, pp. 109 -111.
' "*

T

Around the third week to the end of October, 1998, the Department of Motor Vehicles
notified Creditor Birschbach concerning 10 to 12 vehicles that had been sold but titles not
delivered. Creditor Birschbach and the employed manager, Mr. Neider, cleared the matters up
after about 60 days.1 Creditor Birschbach claims he paid $50,000 to $60,000 to clear these
matters up. Tr. at 1358., pp. 46-49; 101-103. As a result, sometime around the end of November
or early December, 1998, Creditor Birschbach shut the Murray and Midvale car lots down and
also shut Rutherford's business down. Tr. at 1358, p. 111. Ultimately, Creditor Birschbach
sublet the Murray and Midvale car lots out. This occurred, in January, 1999. The Murray Car lot
was sublet out for even money. The Midvale Car lot was sublet out for a positive cash flow of
$500 per month. Tr. at 1358, pp. 111 - 113.

;;

In December, 1998, Creditor Birschbach looked to Rutherford for payment and they made
yet another deal. That deal was that Creditor Birschbach would hire Rutherford as an
independent contractor to sell mortgages for Creditor Birschbach's mortgage company and that
Rutherford would reimburse and pay Creditor Birschbach from his income from selling
mortgages. Rutherford began working for the mortgage company about January, 1999 with the
agreement that he would pay Creditor Rutherford $5,500 per month and that he would also be
credited the $500 per month positive cash flow from the sublet of the Midvale retail lot. Creditor
Birschbach ultimately fired Rutherford about, July 1998. Tr. at 1358, pp. 112 - 115
Creditor Birschbach never looked to Elder for payment after his multiple deals with
Rutherford, except in one instance. That instance was when Garff Leasing, late November, 1998,
notified Creditor Birschbach of a bounced check. The bounced check was one issued from the
Elder and Rutherford partnership bank account before Elder left. Elder thought the check had
cleared at the time he left. When Creditor Birschbach notified him that it had not, Elder checked
his bank records, met with Garff Leasing, and confirmed that it had not. In late December, 1998

]

That is about the end of December, 1998.
9

or early January, 1999, Elder, with Creditor Birschbach's consent, made arrangements to pay,
and did pay, one half of that debt. Tr. at 1358, pp. 104 - 106
VIII. Damages
Creditor Birschbach's expert called to testify as to damages was an accountant employed
by Creditor Birschbach's mortgage broker business that let his Utah CPA certification lapse.
(Buker) Tr. at 1358 pp. 135 - 137. Buker testified that his job was to determine the financial
condition and standing of Creditor Birschbach's limited liability company, Shar's Cars LLC
from its inception in 1997 through the end of December, 1998 . Tr. at 1358, pp 140-145. He
only looked at the records and bank accounts of Creditor Birschbach. He never delved into the
records pertaining to the Elder and Rutherford partnership. The partnership accounts were not
used in his analysis. Tr. at 1358, pp. 139, 142 - 145.

^

Buker also testified that he could not do an analysis as of August 15th, 1998, (the
approximate date of Elder's dissolution of his partnership with Rutherford), with any certainty at
all. He said that his report does not present a full financial picture because it did not include the
Elder and Rutherford partnership bank accounts - only Creditor Birschbach's limited liability
company bank accounts. Consequently Buker testified that his report and opinions were not the
right picture. Tr. at 1358, pp. 146; 147; 149-154. He stated under oath that it was impossible to
come up with some kind of a number that specifically showed what was owed at the time Elder
dissolved the partnership. Tr. at 1358, pp. 161 - 162.

:•,.

After the close of Creditor Birschbach's case, Elder called his own expert, Jensen. Jensen
went through the records of the Elder and Rutherford partnership. Tr. at 1359, pp. 290 - 296.
But even Jensen testified that in his best guess the amount the Elder and Rutherford partnership
owed on the balance sheet was somewhere between $25,000 to $50,000. Tr. at 1359, p. 297. He
also confirmed, as did Buker, that the records were inadequate to come up with anything other
than a guess. Tr. at 1359, pp 297 - 298
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Elder's first argument, (Point I), is that the trial court was correct in concluding that Elder
should not be responsible for one hundred percent of the partnership obligations. The Elder and
Rutherford partnership dissolved about the middle of August, 1998. The partnership did not
wind up because Rutherford and Creditor Birschbach entered into a new agreement. Under the
new agreement, Rutherford simply carried on with Creditor Birschbach, assumed the partnership
obligations and agreed that Elder was released. The new agreement materially altered Elder's
liability for partnership debt under Utah Code Anno., §48-1-33 (2) &(3), (1953), as amended.
When applying the elements of Section 48-1-33 to the facts of this case, the trial court did not err
in concluding that the new agreement between Elder and Rutherford materially altered Elder's
liability for partnership debt.

i

Elder's next argument, (Point II), is that the trial court correctly concluded that there was
a release as to Elder's liability for partnership debt.

While the trial court rejected the legal

theories of novation, substituted agreement, accord, satisfaction , waiver, etc. the trial court's
determination that there was a new agreement and a partial release on that does constitute or is
the equivalent of novation and/or substituted agreement. When considering the evidence,
whether called a "new agreement and release on that agreement", or whether called novation or
substituted agreement, the elements are virtually the same. Based upon the evidence in this case,
the elements clearly support the trial court's determination that there was a new agreement that
resulted in a release of Elder's liability for partnership debt.

*:

Elder's third argument, (Point III) is that the trial court erred by failing to conclude that
Elder was totally released from any partnership liability. Where the partnership dissolved, but
was not wound up, and the reason that it was not wound up was an agreement between the
partnership creditor and the other partner to carry on without Elder, assume the obligations and
release Elder, there is no evidence that would support only a partial release. Rather, based upon

11
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Utah partnership law, specifically Utah Code Anno. §48-1-33 (2) &(3), (1953), as amended, or
based upon the common law theories of novation, substituted agreement, waiver and/or release,
the trial court should have found and concluded that Elder was totally released from any
partnership liability, particularly to Creditor Birschbach..

s

Elder's next argument, (Point IV) is that the trial court erred in concluding that Elder
breached the verbal agreement. The crux of a breach of contract claim is the failure to perform
any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract without legal excuse. While the
evidence in this case suggests that at the time the partnership between Elder and Rutherford was
dissolved, there may have been some unpaid expenses, they were not paid because of sufficient
legal excuse. That legal excuse is the new agreement entered into by Rutherford with Creditor
Birschbach whereby Rutherford agreed to assume and pay the partnership obligations and
Creditor Birschbach went along with that and held Rutherford solely responsible. As a result,
Elder cannot be found to have breached the agreement.
Elder's next argument, (Point V), is that the trial court erred in concluding that any
damages were capable of determination with reasonable certainty. The evidence as to damages
came from two experts, one called by Creditor Birschbach, and the other called by Elder.
Creditor Birschbach's expert testified that he did not analyze the financial circumstances related
to the Elder and Rutherford partnership and that it was impossible to come up with some kind of
number that specifically showed what was owed at the time Elder dissolved the partnership.
Elder's expert also testified that the records were so inadequate that he could not come up with
anything other than a guess. The trial court, as part of its ruling, admitted that the evidence as to
damages ranged anywhere from $220,000 to $25,000 and arbitrarily picked $45,000 as a good
number. Under such analysis and evidence, proof of damages was purely speculative and the
trial court erred in finding that there was any proof of damages with reasonable certainty.
Elder's next argument, (Point VI), is that, if a measure of damages is appropriate, that
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measure is the partnership's net loss at the time of dissolution, not the actual expenses that may
have been unpaid at that time. The evidence showed that because of Creditor Birschbach's new
agreement with Rutherford to carry on without Elder and release him, Elder turned over all of the
partnership's money, inventory, supplies and all other assets for the benefit of Rutherford and
Creditor Birschbach. A net loss measure of damages properly accounts for Elder's interest in
partnership assets. A total expense owed is not an appropriate measure of damages because it
fails to apply Elder's interest in partnership assets against the debt.
Elder's next argument, (Point VII), is that the trial court erred and applied the wrong
standard in denying Elder's motion to dismiss for failure to show a prima facia case of damages
at the conclusion of Creditor Birschbach's case in chief. The trial court ftiled that if Elder elected
not to present any evidence in defense of Creditor Birschbach's claims, a different standard
applied to Elder's motion to dismiss. There is not a different standard. The evidence of damages
at the conclusion of Creditor Birschbach's case was so speculative and indefinite that a prima
facia case had not been shown. The trial erred in failing to dismiss Creditor Birschbach's
complaint at that point.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

*

The Trial Court Was Correct in Concluding That Elder Should Not Be Jointly
Responsible for One Hundred Percent of Partnership Debt.

Birschbach's first contention is that the trial court erred in concluding that Elder was not
jointly liable for all of the partnership obligations. See Brief of Appellant, Argument,
Subparagraph "A". His argument is premised upon partnership law which provides that each
partner in a general partnership is jointly liable for the whole of partnership debt.
The fallacy behind Birschbach's argument is that it focuses on one limited aspect of
partnership law; that is joint liability. Birschbach fails to marshal the evidence in support of
partnership law recognizing that a partner's liability can change. It can change as a result of, as
13

in this case, a new agreement. The trial court specifically found that upon dissolution a new
agreement was entered into changing Elder's partnership liability. Tr. at 1359, p. 358
The partnership between Elder and dissolved the middle to the third week of August,
1998. Dissolution is defined under Utah law as the change in the relation of partners by one
refusing to be further associated with the carrying on of the partnership business. Section 48-126 defines it as follow:
The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the partners caused
by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on, as distinguished from
the winding up, of the business.
Utah Code Anno. § 48-1-26, (1953), as amended.
The evidence is that Elder was partnered with Rutherford, carrying on a business of
wholesaling and retailing motor vehicles, beginning early 1998. Elder refused to be associated
with the carrying on of that business as of the middle to the third week of August, 1998. Elder
had no further involvement in the carrying on of the business thereafter. (See Statement of Facts,
Section V, The Dissolution; Tr. at 1358, pp 8-9; 258 & Tr. at 1359, p. 248). Under the
provisions of Section 48-1-26 the partnership between Elder and Rutherford dissolved the middle
to the end of August, 1998.
The dissolution of a partnership does not change a partner's liability for partnership debt.
The partnership continues until there is a complete winding up of all partnership business and
affairs. However, the authority of the partners to act for the partnership is terminated. These
principals are set forth in Sections 48-1-27 and 48-1-30. Section 48-1-27 states:
On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up
of partnership affairs is completed.
Utah Code Anno. §48-1-27, (1953), as amended.
Section 48-1-30 states:
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Except so far as may be necessary to wind up partnership affairs or to complete
transactions begun but not then finished, dissolution terminates all authority of
any partner to act for the partnership.
Utah Code anno. § 48-1-30, (1953), as amended.
Under the facts of this case a winding up never took place after dissolution. A winding
up never took place because the business was carried on without Elder. (See Statement of Facts,
Section VI, The New Agreement, Section VII, The Course of Conduct After Dissolution; Tr. at
1358; pp. 86-98). Nevertheless, under the principles of partnership law stated above, Rutherford
had no power or authority to bind Elder or act on the partnership's behalf, except to close the
business up and pay the debts.
The business was not wound up, closed, or the debts payed, because there was a new
agreement.2 Utah partnership law recognizes that a partner's liability for partnership debt can
change based upon such a new agreement, particularly as a result of persons or other partners
carrying on the business without winding it up. Section 48-1-33, subsections (2) & (3) address
this circumstance. They state:
(2) A partner is discharged for any existing liability upon dissolution of the
partnership by an agreement to that effect between himself, the partnership
creditor and the person or partnership continuing the business; and such
agreement may be inferred from the course of dealing between the creditor having
knowledge of the dissolution and the person or partnership continuing the
business.
(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved
partnership, the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be discharged
from any liability to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the
agreement, consents to a material alteration in the nature or time of payment of
such obligations.

2

Logic and the law dictate that one cannot carry on a partnership business after
dissolution and without winding up absent some sort of agreement, manifested either expressly
or by course of conduct.
,
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Utah Code Anno. § 48-1-33 (2) & (3), (1953), as amended.3
Under Subsection (2) above, a partner's liability is discharged under the following
circumstances: 1) Dissolution of the partnership; 2) A new agreement between the partner to be
discharged, the partnership creditor, and the person continuing the business; 3) The new
agreement being to the effect that the partner's liability is discharged; and 4) the new agreement
need not be express but may be inferred simply from the course of dealing between the
partnership creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and the person continuing the business.4
The facts support the trial court's decision under the above Subsection (2) that Elder's

3

The entire text of Section 48-1-33 is:

(1) The dissolution of a partnership does not of itself discharge
the existing liability of any partner.
(2) A partner is discharged for any existing liability upon
dissolution of the partnership by an agreement to that effect between
himself, the partnership creditor and the person or partnership
continuing the business; and such agreement may be inferred from the
course of dealing between the creditor having knowledge of the
dissolution and the person or partnership continuing the business.
^
(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a
^
dissolved partnership, the partners whose obligations have been assumed
shall be discharged from any liability to any creditor of the partnership
who, knowing of the agreement, consents to a material alteration in the
nature or time of payment of such obligations.

J

(4) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for
those obligations of the partnership incurred while he was a partner and
for which the partner was liable under Section 48-1-12, but subject to
the prior payment of his separate debts.
Utah Code Anno. § 48-1-33, (1953), as amended.
4

The significant point with respect to this provision is that the agreement need only be
inferred from the course of dealing between the partnership creditor and the person carrying on
the business. Facts as to a course of dealing with the partnership creditor need not be shown.
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partnership liability was changed and discharged.5 First, the evidence shows that the partnership
dissolved. (See, Statement of Facts, Section V, The Dissolution; Tr.at 1358, pp. 8-9; 258 & Tr.
at 1359, p. 248). Creditor Birschbach knew the partnership dissolved. (See, Statement of Facts,
Section V, The Dissolution; Tr. at 1358 pp. 10-11; 19-20; 27; 46; 92-93; 98). A new agreement
was entered into between Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford. . (See Statement of Facts,
Section VI, The New Agreement; Tr. at 1358, pp. 45; 92-99 & Tr. at 1359, pp. 248-250). The
evidence shows that the agreement was to the effect that the old partner's liability, that of Elder,
was discharged. (See, Id.). The course of conduct between Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford,
as well as between Creditor Birschbach and Elder, shows that the new agreement was to the
effect that Elder's existing partnership liability was discharged. (See Statement of Facts, Section
VII, The Course of Conduct After Dissolution; Tr. at 1358, pp. 15-16, 37-39; 49; 84-98, 104 106, 109-115 & Tr. at 1359, pp. 251-252 ). All of the factual elements in support of the trial
court's decision of a new agreement that affected and discharged Elder's liability are fully
supported. The conclusions are consistent with the proper application of law.
Under the above subsection (3), Elder is also discharged from liability. The elements are:
1) A dissolved partnership; 2) A partnership creditor that knows of the dissolution; 3) A person
that agrees to assume the existing obligations of the dissolved partnership; 4) The partnership
creditor knowing of the agreement; and 5) The partnership creditor consents to a material
alteration in the nature or time of payment of such obligations.

<|

The facts show that the elements of subsection (3) are also met. Again, the evidence
shows that the partnership dissolved. (See, Statement of Facts, Section V, The Dissolution; Tr.at
1358, pp. 8-9; 258 & Tr. at 1359, p. 248). Creditor Birschbach knew the partnership dissolved.

5

While Elder argues here that the facts support the trial court's decision that the new
agreement affected Elder's liability for partnership debt, he contends as part of his cross-appeal
that the trial court erred in not concluding that Elder was discharged of liability on all partnership
debt.
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(See, Statement of Facts, Section V, The Dissolution; Tr. at 1358 pp. 10-11; 19-20; 27; 46; 9293; 98). A new agreement was entered into between Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford. . (See
Statement of Facts, Section VI, The New Agreement; Tr. at 1358, pp. 45; 92-99 & Tr. at 1359,
pp. 248-250). Under that new agreement, and in his discussions with Elder, Rutherford agreed
to assume the existing liabilities and obligations of the dissolved partnership. Creditor
Birschbach knew of that agreement and was instrumental in its formation. (See, Statement of
Facts, Section VI, The New Agreement; Tr. at 1358, pp. 45, 92-99, 112-115 & Tr. at 1359, pp.
248-250). Under the new agreement with Rutherford, Creditor Birschbach consented to material
alterations in the nature and time of payment of the obligations owed to him. (See, Statement of
Facts, Section VII, The Course of Conduct After Dissolution). For example, a $25,000 loan
made by Creditor Birschbach to the partnership on a 30 to 60 day term was extended for
Rutherford's benefit to allow him to make $500 to $600 per month payments. Tr. at 1358, pp.
37-40, 84-86. Another example is a material change in the nature of the expenses to be paid
under the agreement. That is, Rutherford, with Creditor Birschbach's consent, opened a second
retail car lot, doubling the expenses that were the subject of the verbal agreement. (Tr. at 1358,
pp. 109-111). The elements of the above Subsection 3 are clearly satisfied and the trial court
was correct in concluding that Elder's joint and several liability for partnership debt was altered.
In conclusion, Creditor Birschbach wants this Court to conclude that the trial court erred
by not finding Elder responsible for one hundred per cent of the obligation owed.6 The problem
is that Creditor Birschbach fails to marshal the facts in support of the trial court's decision that
there was a new agreement consistent with Utah partnership law that altered Elder's liability.
The trial court should not be reversed on this point.

, i'S

6

Creditor Birschbach contends under his first argument that he was obligated to pay
expenses of $220,000 which the Elder/Rutherford partnership should have been obligated to
cover. This argument is addressed below as to damages. The evidence shows that if there is
$220,000 in damages, they originated from Creditor Birschbach's dealings with Rutherford after
the new agreement was entered into.
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POINT II.

The Trial Court Was Correct in Concluding That There Was a Release as to
Elder's Responsibility for Partnership Debt.

Creditor Birschbach's next argument is that the trial court erred in finding that there was a
partial release of Elder from partnership debt. See, Brief of Appellant, Argument, Subheading
"B". Creditor Birschbach's argument on this point is that the facts were insufficient to support a
finding of release. He speculates that the only evidence admitted at trial that might support a
release was the evidence relating to a bounced check to Garff leasing where Elder stepped up,
four months after dissolution of an approximate nine month partnership deal with Creditor
Birschbach, and agreed to pay half of a bounced check he mistakenly thought had been paid
before he left.
This evidence relates solely to the trial court's conclusion on Creditor Birschbach's
argument that Elder lacked "clean hands". The trial court concluded that Creditor Birschbach's
clean hands argument failed because Elder stepped up and paid half of the bounced check four
months after dissolution. No where does the trial court state that this evidence related to its
conclusion of release. See Tr. 1359 at 359

%

Not only does Creditor Birschbach's argument fail for the above stated reason, the trial
court's conclusion of release is amply supported by the evidence as stated under Point I above - that is the evidence relating to the new agreement between Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford
and the course of dealing that took place between them after Elder left.
On this issue, the trial court found no novation, accord, satisfaction, or waiver. However
the trial court specifically found a new agreement and a partial release of liability on that. See
Tr. 1359 at 357 - 360 . This issue relates to semantical differences surrounding legal
nomenclature - that being the use of "novation", or "substituted agreement", "release", "waiver",
etc., as opposed to the term as used by the trial court, "new agreement" & "partial release".
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A "novation" is a new agreement. Black's Law Dictionary defines novation as follows:
"Substitution of a new contract, debt, or obligation for an existing one, between the same or
different parties." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., (1979). Under Utah law, whether an
agreement is a novation is a matter of intent. The essential element is the discharge of one of the
parties to the contract and the acceptance of a new performer by the other party as a substitute for
the first original party. See, First Amer. Commerce v. Wash. Mut. Sav., 743 P.2d 1193 (Utah
1987). And it is a new contract that substitutes in the place of the previous one.7
Factually, a novation, not a delegation occurred, in this case. There was an existing
contract. The original verbal contract was between the Elder and Rutherford partnership on the
one hand and Creditor Birschbach on the other. (See Statement of Facts, Section III, The Verbal
Contract). There was a new contract. (See Statement of Facts, Section VI, the New
Agreement). The contract was between different parties. The original agreement was between a
partnership and Creditor Birschbach. The substituted agreement was between Rutherford, a
former partner, and Creditor Birschbach. (See Statement of Facts, Section III, the Verbal
Contract & Section VI, the New Agreement). There was an acceptance on the part of Creditor
Birschbach of a new performer, that is Rutherford, individually, in substitution of the Elder and
Rutherford partnership. The intent that Elder was discharged under the new agreement is equally
clear. The new agreement was that Rutherford would be substituted in place of the Elder and
Rutherford partnership and that Elder would be discharged. (See Statement of Facts, Section VI,
the New Agreement). Likewise, the course of conduct after the new agreement was entered into
demonstrates that the agreement discharged Elder of liability. (See, Statement of Facts, Section
VII, The Course of Conduct After Dissolution).

7

As explained in the First Amer. Commerce v. Wash. Mut. Sav., case, a novation is
different than a delegation wherein a contractually obligated party delegates his duties to another,
remaining liable to the creditor for performance. See, First Amer. Commerce v. Wash. Mut. Sav.
743 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1987).
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A "substituted agreement" is also a new agreement. It is a contract accepted by the
obligee in satisfaction of the obligor's existing duty. It discharges the original duty, and breach
of the substituted agreement does not give rise to a claim of breach under the original contract.
The original obligations are merged into the substituted agreement and the original liabilities and
duties are discharged. Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346 (Utah App. 1987). Factually, this
occurred in this case for the same reasons and upon the same evidence referenced above.
Additionally, other contract law supports the trial court's decision as to the new
agreement and its effect upon Elder's liability. These include, executory accord, accord and
satisfaction, waiver and release.
More importantly, as explained under Point I above, Section 48-1-33 of the Utah
Partnership Act sets the rule, incorporating various elements of the common law theories
described herein above, and dictating how those elements affect liability under partnership law.
Under Section 48-1-33, Elder's partnership liability was released at least partially, if not wholly.8

POINT III.

The Trial Court Erred in Not Finding and Concluding That Elder Was Totally
Released from Any Partnership Liability.

Elder's counter-appeal centers principally on the argument that the trial court erred in not
deciding that Elder was totally released from any liability to Creditor Birschbach. While Elder
agrees with that trial court that there was a new agreement and that the effect of the agreement
was a release, Elder assigns as error the trial court's conclusion that it was a partial release, not a
whole release.

v

Elder's first argument on this point is that the trial court erred in not concluding that Elder
was wholly released from liability pursuant to Utah Code Anno. § 48-1-33 (2) & (3), (1953), as

8

On this point, Elder contends that the trial court did err in not concluding that there was a
whole release of liability as to Elder.
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amended. As set forth in Point I above, Section 48-1-33(2) calls for the discharge of a partner's
liability for partnership debt when: 1) the partnership dissolves; 2) a new agreement between the
partner to be discharged, the partnership creditor, and the person continuing the business is
entered into; 3) the new agreement is to the effect that the partner's liability is discharged; and 4)
the new agreement need not be express but may be inferred simply from the course of dealing
between the partnership creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and the person continuing
the business.9 As stated under Points I and II above, the evidence clearly establishes each of the
above elements.
Likewise under Section 48-1-33 (3), Elder is discharged from liability. As stated under •*•
Point I above, the elements are: 1) A dissolved partnership; 2) A partnership creditor that knows
of the dissolution; 3) A person that agrees to assume the existing obligations of the dissolved
partnership; 4) The partnership creditor knowing of the agreement; and 5) The partnership
creditor consents to a material alteration in the nature or time of payment of such obligations.
Again as shown under Points I and II above, the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that
Elder was discharged from liability.

\&

And, the theories of novation and/or substituted agreement support Elder's contention
that he was discharged wholly from partnership liability. The elements as set forth under Points I
and II above and the facts as set forth under the Statement of Facts clearly and convincingly show
that Elder was wholly discharged from his contractual obligations to Creditor Birschbach.

POINT IV.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That Elder Breached the Contract.

By counter-appeal Elder also contends that the trial court erred in deciding and

9

Again, the significant point with respect to this provision is that the agreement need only
be inferred from the course of dealing between the partnership creditor and the person carrying
on the business. Facts as to a course of dealing with the partnership creditor need not be shown.
22

concluding that Elder breached the verbal agreement with Creditor Birschbach. "The elements of
pi -ma facie eas, .

"

•* • iormance by the

party seeking recovery; (3) breach of UK IOUHM. . b- ihe oihei pan-*
crux ot a bread- * ' •
2001 i

' la1

*

,l

n; I tTi damages." ^he

" • s ^.. K ampin.-.. M.uu * .V: Sessions V. Dehrv.

\pp V)7. 3K P nl 984 II is defined as (he lailure lo perlonp an\ prompt \\'"\

• -. ^. !h : • ,>i part of the contract - that is without legal excuse. Black' s ! aw Dictionary, 5th ed.

Here there is 4io question thai a \erbal cnniracl was entered nuo earK 1008 that called for
;

certain duties and obngauoi • ' : • • . * > - • . •

-

Statemeni of facts. Section III, The Verbal Vgreemem *
p •; •••!

p

• •'

-

-n ,

^ec

* p ;i, = i ihe dissolution o! .b<*

^ligations v 1 ^ 4 h" 'i^de* die contract uciv satisfied, except some

, «'

v

expenses had not been paid

• - . - . , .

^

-:*M»M

were not paid because of a legal excuse. The legal excuse has heen amply explained in each oi
t> > *( •

. •'. •

•

that is a new agreement was entered into.

\ ndei ihe new agreement. Rutherford and Creditor Birschbach agreed to carry on without
1

' , ! \ r p - ••

>

•

,

,-p partnership obligations owed to ( w .lilor

Birschbach.10 Thereafter Rutherford and ( rethiew Uu^chhacL

.i

. . * CIMM =\c> v..-u -k

with the new agreement. There are no facts that remotely suggest a delegation of Elder's
panne" : -p ••'-•tiL-.ai'

i'

'

(

;

••

' •-

'• '•• w -.h-w\ ^hat there was a

substitution oi no\auMi thai released Elder firm his partnership duties .una oDiigauons « >e i \
Creditor Birschbac!

!

h^ ^p-amucs a legal excuse

court erred in i uiu In

i <• •

. .*

because oi the new agreement. Ui. trial

• . • :•

.

or iMrscnbacu.

!f

...

_

^

N

s on can" i iouiealh have a breach of the agreement if you agree to contiime the contract
w^h a third party thai anoKes an assumption of debt of die mVinal parties

23

POINT V.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That Damages Were Capable of
Determination

Even if Elder breached his contractual obligations to Creditor Birschbach, the trial court
mistakenly concluded that damages from the breach were capable of determination with
reasonable certainty. Damages must be shown with reasonable certainty. Kraatz v. Heritage
Imports, 2003 UT App 201 71 P.3d 188. The reasonable certainty standard requires proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. That is that damages are shown with sufficient certainty that
reasonable minds would conclude that damages were actually suffered. The certainty
requirement is met when there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to
make a reasonable approximation. Id.
In this case, there was not sufficient evidence to enable the trial court to make a
reasonable approximation. As stated by the trial court, the evidence relating to damages consisted
of the following: 1) $220,000 from Creditor Birschbach's expert; 2) $160,000 from Creditor
Birschbach's attorney; 3) a range somewhere between $25,000 or $30,000 to $50,000 from
Elder's expert.

Tr. 1359 360-361. The trial court further concluded, in answer to Elder's

attorney's argument that proof of damages was speculative at best, that Elder's expert gave the
best evidence consisting of a range between $25,000 to $50,000. The court then arbitrarily ruled
that $45,000 was a good number and awarded Creditor Birschbach half tliat. Tr. at 1359, 32604

361.

An award of damages based upon speculation cannot be upheld. Cook Assocs., Inc. v.
Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 1983). The evidence must not be so indefinite as to
allow the fact finder to speculate freely as to the amount of damages. Penelko, Inc. v. John Price
Associates, Inc., 642 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1982). In this case the evidence and the trial court's
ruling show that the issue of damages was a free for all, anywhere from $25,000 to $220,000.
Even the best evidence relied upon by the trial court, that of Elder's own expert was qualified by
24

».* • p. i; u-> •)) -i\ *hat damages \\as a Inroad !.ini!c at best and Ixtsed upon inaccurate
information

iust a guess.

i

< ivditor Birsehbach\ accoumani. linker qualified his report and opinion by stating
under oai. tha; IK IK-. .:• .ie-- .•

. »*..i • .-• •

--word* and that those

accounts were not used in his analysis. He also qualified his testimoiu mai In^ h-r leiatci: M* ,
^

i -i :

>l Credito 1 Birsehbach

completely separate business operated s

limited liability compam . which was ;

< »

••

• ':" "• ' "

142-145.

"•

• v5

*

As to i i c financial condition of the part:i,:

.;,

h

the same date the new agreement between Rutherford and Creditor Birsehbach was entered a *o
h .<• - i •, .

'• i - • r ' .v.- v\-!\nn:- r- • ' ' » n 1 ; ^ S np . .-•

.

1";H 1M 1(>2 I d d e f s expert CPA. Jensen. iesUh^; - .he same ilmw

^

:

-iv^'*

coire up wv.h am thing other than a guess because the records are so inadequate. 1 r at 1 o 9 . pp.
I**.

..:

:

• -s: ^

: • .. * * • »- -

• ••

ae evidence was so indcfmin thai the

trial i i-tin could not w ah am reasonable eeriau i \ . appmxiinak- an\ ;o^s caused w

POINT VI.

\

I he I rial Court Did Not Err in Concluding That Damages Should Be Based upon
the Partnership's Net Loss
<
.

Creditor Birsehbach's next argument is that the tnal couit erred in .mauling d a m a g e
based upon the Elder and Rutherford partnership's net loss, i k i ontends that the awaui I
damages should li;n been lulled upm ""l|

""

..

auandinu at 1 v approximate link that /_

Elder dissolved his partnership with Ruilieriuivi. see Bnei oi Appeiiam "•uiMKajmg <. ''.
": ,aL-i

• - p ! - :l-

it ai inc iim.* lUler dissolved Ins

partnership with Rutherford, he turned the business over pursuant i< = i .raiei iou:

a.u: \ .v*

Birsehbach's new agreement. The partnership nloney, inventory, supplies, office equipment,
25

records and any and all other assets relating to the Elder and Rutherford partnership, including all
the books and records were simply turned over to Rutherford and Creditor Birschbach sp they
could carry on. (See, Statement of Facts, Section VII, The Course of Conduct After Dissolution;
Tr. at 1358, pp. 15-16. 37-39, 49, 84-91, 96-98, & Tr. at 1359, pp, 251-252). If the
circumstances surrounding Rutherford's and Creditor Birschbach's new agreement are
disregarded, then Elder will have been deprived of any opportunity to apply his interest in
partnership assets against the liabilities assumed by Rutherford and carried on with Creditor
Birschbach. Consequently, the trial court's determination was correct, that is using a net loss
calculation, if damages are appropriate at all. It is an appropriate measure of damages, if
damages are appropriate at all, where assets are simply turned over to a partnership creditor and
another party as part of a new agreement.

POINT VII.

j

The Trial Court Erred in Not Granting Elder's Motion to Dismiss at the
Conclusion of Creditor Birschbach's Case in Chief
T

At the conclusion of Creditor Birschbach's case in chief, Elder moved to dismiss on the
basis that Creditor Birschbach failed to put on a prima facie case of damages. Tr. at 1359, pp.
225, 243-244. The standard here is to view Creditor Birschbach's evidence in a light most
favorable to him and conclude whether the evidence alone is sufficient. Mahmood V. Ross, 1999
UT 104, 990 P.2d 933. In this case the evidence at the time Elder moved to dismiss was as stated
under Point V above. That is that Creditor Birschbach had no idea what might have been owed
to him at the time Elder dissolved the partnership because of the new agreement. His own expert
admits that there is no reasonable certainty on that issue and it was impossible for him to derive
that.

;
A prima facia case is one where sufficient evidence has been put on and the Defendant

becomes obligated to put on a defense or lose. The evidence must be sufficiently compelling that
the Plaintiff would prevail if the Defendant put on no evidence at all. At the close of Creditor
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Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's conclusion that there
\\,r, onk ,i partial ivlrise <»' lu •
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Hi ment entered m fa\ or of Creditor

Birschbach in the amount of $22,5 Ui \ 1 ii i s v * :• t a I ' a it -1 E i u a i so remaiiu -a % ase
with instructions directing that coi in io enter ap oidci dismissing Creditor Birschbach's
compia
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DATED this

//

day of August, 2003.

Qt£

/< £>£•«/•

J C r f K. RICE
Attorney for Appellee, Deloy Elder
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

•

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,
postage prepaid and first class, this / /

day of August, 2003, to the following:

STEVEN G. LOOSLE
KRUSE, LANDA, MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC
50 West Broadway, Suite 800 (84101)
P.O. Box 45561
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0561
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